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In The Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that "even a dog
distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked."1  Holmes
suggested that even dogs can tell the difference between intentional aggression
and benign mistake, and his observation is often cited to show how a vague
legal standard can still have clear applications. 2 Far less often is the quote
considered as an empirical statement about the abilities of dogs. In that light,
the quote suggests that dogs can understand humans well enough to discern the
motivation (or lack thereof) behind some physical interaction between them. If
dogs can understand the ways we treat them, we may think it matters more
whether we treat them compassionately or cruelly.3 And if dogs can make such
distinctions, we may wonder how much more fine-grained and sensitive are the
perceptions of smarter animals like chimpanzees and gorillas.
. J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, 2002; A.B., summa cum laude, highest honors
in philosophy, Princeton University, 1996. I would like to thank Judge Richard Posner and
Professors Tom Grey, Agnieszka Jaworska, Robert Sapolsky, and Peter Singer for their very
helpful comments on all or parts of an earlier draft of this Note.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 7 (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., Little,
Brown and Co. 1963) (1881).
2. For example, Justice Stevens noted Holmes' observation during oral arguments in
Bush v. Gore regarding the standard of voter intent under Florida election law. Transcript of
Oral Argument at 49, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) (comments by Justice
Stevens).
3. Arguably, even if a dog's suffering should be minimized, it does not matter whether
the dog thinks a human intentionally or accidentally caused it pain. Nevertheless, perhaps
because people do not want to be thought cruel and mean, even by a dog, human behavior is
likely to be influenced by our assumptions about canine perceptiveness.
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Calling the effort the Great Ape Project ("Project"), a number of scholars,
scientists, and activists have organized to demand recognition of moral and
legal rights for great apes. In the category of great apes, the Project includes
chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, gorillas, and, surprisingly or not, humans.
Supporters of the Project would like to see radical changes in the ways we treat
great apes. These changes, if enforced globally, would mean an end to most
biomedical experimentation on great apes; would largely eliminate the
potential use of great apes for organ donations;4 would prohibit, or at least
require dramatic improvements, in the keeping of great apes in zoos; and would
eliminate the use of great apes as a source of food.5 Perhaps more radical
sounding are the Project's claims that great apes should be considered equals
with humans in the sense that the rights of apes should be respected no less
than those of humans and that court-appointed guardians or other organizations
should be enabled to protect the legal rights of great apes by bringing suit on
their behalf. The Great Ape Project seeks nothing less than full moral and legal
"personhood" for great apes.
Legal academia is awakening to the growing interest in the legal protection
of apes and other animals. In 1999, Harvard Law School and Georgetown Law
School announced that they would offer their first classes ever in animal law.6
Less than a year later, Harvard's animal law instructor, Steven Wise, published
a book demanding legal rights for chimpanzees and bonobos.7 In what may be
the clearest sign that discussion of great ape legal rights has entered
mainstream legal discourse, Judge Richard Posner reviewed Wise's book in the
Yale Law Journal.8 Although Posner does criticize Wise's approach, he is
surprisingly uncritical of Wise's aims and faults Wise principally on
methodological grounds. 9
4. For views on transplanting animal organs into humans, known as
xenotransplantation, see Arthur L. Caplan, Is Xenografting Morally Wrong?, in THE ETHICS
OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 121, 123 (Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998); Traci
J. Hoffman, Organ Donor Laws in the U.S. and UK.: The Need for Reform and the Promise
of Xenotransplantation, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 371-72 (2000).
Xenotransplantations are controversial from the standpoint of animal advocates, since they
usually require the killing of otherwise healthy animals.
5. Expressed more dramatically, apes are killed to feed "the growing fad for 'bush
meat' on the tables of the elite in Cameroon, Gabon, the Congo, the Central African
Republic, and other countries." Donald G. McNeil Jr., The Great Ape Massacre, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 54-55. Apes are also killed "so that their hands,
feet, and skulls can be displayed as trophies," STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE:
TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 5 (2000).
6. William Glaberson, Legal Pioneers Seek to Raise Lowly Status of Animals, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1999, at Al.
7. WISE, supra note 5.
8. Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE L.J. 527 (2000) (reviewing WISE,
supra note 5).
9. Id. at 539 ("There is a sad poverty of imagination in an approach to animal
protection that can think of it only on the model of the civil rights movement. It is a poverty
that reflects the blinkered approach of the traditional lawyer, afraid to acknowledge novelty
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In Martha Nussbaum's review of Wise's book in the Harvard Law Review,
Nussbaum reveals a basic sympathy for Wise's project:
We live, many of us, in affectionate relationships with dogs and cats and
horses. And yet a large population of us not only eat meat and eggs and wear
leather, but we also collaborate in the appallingly cruel conditions under
which those goods are produced these days, involving the torture of calves,
chickens, and pigs.... [W]e have not defined very clearly the conceptual
framework we should use to articulate philosophically what sympathy tells us
in our lives.... Meanwhile, however, there are animals like [the apes that
Wise describes] leading lives of agony, and there are activists, like Steven
Wise, ready to move ahead with practical legal recommendations, even in the
absence of conceptual and theoretical consensus.10
No country has granted great apes anything near the kinds of rights sought
by Steven Wise or the Great Ape Project. However, some countries have
enacted significant protections for great apes. In 1996, biomedical research on
great apes was banned in Britain. 11 According to New Zealand's Animal
Welfare Act of 1999,12 "research, testing, or teaching" great apes requires
approval from New Zealand's government official in charge of animal
welfare.1 3 The official can only give approval when satisfied that the activity
in question benefits the individual ape or that it benefits the ape's species and
"the benefits [of the activity] are not outweighed by the likely harm[s]."'14
Thus, the changes in New Zealand law mean that experimentation on great
apes must, first and foremost, benefit great apes. The enactment of these
protections can largely be traced to efforts by the Great Ape Project and its
New Zealand affiliate. 15 Whether one likes or dislikes the efforts made by the
and therefore unable to think clearly about the reasons pro or con a departure from the legal
status quo.").
10. Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV.
L. REv. 1506, 1509-12 (2001) (offering a philosophically-oriented discussion of WisE, supra
note 5). Even more dramatically in the California Law Review, Robert Verchick writes that
Wise's book "marks what could become one of the groundbreaking civil rights battles of the
next generation." Robert R.M. Verchick, A New Species of Rights, 89 CAL. L. REV. 207
(2001) (reviewing WISE, supra note 5).
11. WISE, supra note 5, at 75 (indicating the British government's belief that the
cognitive and behavioral capacities of great apes make it unethical to "treat them as
expendable in research").
12. Animal Welfare Act (1999) (N.Z.), available at http://www.maf.govt.nzl
biosecurity/legislation/animal-welfare-act/index.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2001).
13. Id. at § 85(l)
14. Id. at § 85(5).
15. Paula Brosnahan, New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act: What Is Its Value Regarding
Non-Human Hominids?, 6 ANIMAL L. 185, 187-90 (2000). The changes enacted fell far
short of the changes sought by the Great Ape Project New Zealand. Id. Also, their impact
on great apes is likely to be limited as New Zealand has few great apes, id. at 191, and no
biomedical experimentation on great apes. See Seth Mydans, He's Not Hairy, He's My
Brother, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 2001, § 4, at 5.
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Great Ape Project, they are having an effect on the laws governing animal
protection and experimentation.
Furthermore, moral and legal issues raised by the Great Ape Project have
implications beyond the treatment of great apes. Researchers in Portland,
Oregon recently reported success in inserting genes from a jellyfish into a
rhesus monkey. The senior researcher said that "his ultimate goal was to create
colonies of monkeys that had been genetically modified to develop a human
disease." 16 At the same time that colonies of monkeys are being created to lose
their lives to benefit humans, humans are risking their lives to save animals. 17
In Colorado, an eleven-year, seven billion dollar project is underway to clean
up nuclear waste in order to create a wildlife preserve. At least ten workers on
the project were exposed to radiation during this dangerous work.18 We are
frequently, though usually subconsciously, making tradeoffs between the
interests of humans and the interests of nonhuman animals. How we decide to
treat animals can affect our legal regimes related to the environment, animal
welfare, endangered species, agribusiness, the consumption and production of
food, animal testing, veterinary malpractice, and more.
More broadly still, our treatment of great apes raises questions about the
principles which underlie human equality. We usually hold that human beings
should have equal rights, regardless of their cognitive abilities. Yet, we deny
great apes basic protections afforded to humans, often citing the lower
intelligence of great apes as a factor. However, the cognitive capacities of
great apes can rival or surpass those of very young children and humans with
severe cognitive deficits. 19 Some commentators, including members of the
Great Ape Project, compare great apes to these humans in order to argue, as a
matter of equality, that great apes deserve the same moral and legal protections
afforded to young children and humans with severe cognitive deficits. This
move is certainly controversial, and Judge Posner has described it as
"monstrous."'20 At a minimum, however, it has forced us to consider a new
16. Gina Kolata, Monkey Born With Genetically Engineered Cells, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
1999, at Al. On the plus side, of course, the research is designed to someday help treat
diseases in humans. It is also possible that such research could reduce the number of
primates used in biological research by making more efficient use of primate subjects.
Nevertheless, there is certainly something grim about designing monkeys to develop fatal
diseases.
17. When I refer to "animals," I usually drop the implied qualification that I am
referring to "nonhuman animals."
18. Michael Janofsky, Workers Cleaning Nuclear Anns Site for Wildlife Preserve Test
Positive for Radiation, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 8, 2000, at A19. Of course, it could be argued that
wildlife preserves are intended solely for the benefit of humans who enjoy nature. I think it
is hard to understand, however, how a person could care about nature without thinking that
the well-being of its members is a good in its own right.
19. See Caplan, supra note 4, at 128.
20. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 49 (1999)
("Yet it would be monstrous in our culture to deduce that severely retarded human beings
are entitled to no more consideration than animals or even that they are entitled to less
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perspective on the principles underlying our concept of human equality and the
boundaries that we give to morally- and legally-protected forms of life.
This Note explores some of the moral and legal arguments made for the
protection of great apes and other animals. Part I provides basic information
about great apes and their abilities and the laws protecting them in the United
States. It also discusses the kinds of legal protections sought by the Great Ape
Project. While the Great Ape Project and Steven Wise seek similar protections
for great apes, I focus on the Great Ape Project since it has demonstrated its
ability to influence legislation and its philosophical foundations lie at the heart
of much of the "animal liberation" movement. This movement, as sparked in
large measure by Peter Singer's 1975 book, Animal Liberation,2 1 holds that the
interests of all animals, human and otherwise, should be given equal moral
consideration. A critical analysis of Singer's position forms the focus of Part I
and sets the stage for a discussion of a particular policy proposal. This policy
proposal, discussed in Part III, vastly restricts the discussion of great ape
personhood to a much less ambitious legal issue in the law of standing. More
specifically, I explore the argument that great apes (and perhaps other animals)
should be granted standing to bring lawsuits, through a human guardian, under
the Animal Welfare Act (AWA).22 The law of standing currently prevents
humans from suing on behalf of animals that suffer injuries under the AWA. I
explore the idea that Congress could further the substantive goals of the AWA
by granting standing to apes and other animals without upsetting constitutional
standing requirements. Granting standing to great apes does not require us to
accept arguments about ape personhood but merely requires recognition of
certain obligations to protect animal interests. I argue that the standing
proposal is far less radical than it might sound at first and that it is at least
worthy of further consideration.
consideration than the smartest animals, who are smarter than the dumbest people; just to
refer to people as 'dumb' grates on our sensibilities."). For an in-depth discussion of the
argument Posner addresses, sometimes called the "argument from marginal cases," see
DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI, BABIES AND BEASTS: THE ARGUMENT FROM MARGINAL CASES
(1997). Such comparisons deeply touch the public conscience. In a recent discussion on
parenting on Bill Maher's show "Politically Incorrect," Maher compared his dogs to
"retarded children," saying "They're sweet. They're loving. They're kind. But they don't
mentally advance at all." Lynda Van Kuren, spokeswoman for a group which advocates for
children with disabilities said, 'Those types of statements simply perpetuate the types of
misconceptions that exist that are just wrong." Maher apologized profusely for the
comment. TV Host's Words Draw Criticism and Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2001, at
A20.
21. PETER SINGER, ANIMALLIBERATION (1st ed. 1975).
22. 7 U.S.C §§ 2131-2159 (2001).
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I. GREAT APES AND THE GREAT APE PROJECT
A. Great Ape Biology and Ecology
Most great apes are native to Africa, with the exception of orangutans
which are native to the islands of Borneo and Sumatra in Asia. If we were
focusing on the preservation of great apes as a species, our most important
issues would be wildlife preservation in countries with native populations of
great apes and the local and international laws protecting endangered species.23
The focus of the Great Ape Project, however, is largely on individual great
apes as potential rights-bearers. To that end, we will focus on great apes in the
United States and the laws which protect (or fail to protect) them. An informal
census of great apes living in the United States counted as follows:
A few thousand great apes currently live in the United States. Some 2,000
chimpanzees are in laboratories, 800-900 in zoos, and a few in entertainment.
Ten to twenty orang-utans are used for entertainment, fifteen to twenty in
laboratories, and several hundred are kept in zoos. Almost 300 gorillas are in
zoos, ten to fifteen in laboratories, and currently none are known to be used
for entertainment, though one is kept on display in a shopping centre in
Tacoma, Washington. 24
Traditionally, taxonomists use the term ape (or "hominoid") to apply to
certain primates, including humans, that split off from other primates
approximately 20 millions years ago.25 Apes differ notably from other
primates because they have no tail and they habitually sit and sometimes stand
upright.26 Included in the ape superfamily are the "great apes" (the family
Pongidae)27 and the family which includes humans and some of our recently
extinct ancestors (the family Hominidae).28 To put it another way, humans
have traditionally been considered apes but not "great apes."
23. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2001); see also
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 8,
1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087; The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources, Sept. 15, 1968, 1976 U.N.T.S. 4.
24. David Cantor, Items of Property, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT 280, 280 (Paola
Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., 1993).
25. FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS
AND OTHER ANIMALS 4,(1996).
26. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAMMALS 120 (Erwin Gould & George McKay eds., 2d ed.
1998); see also DAgxs R. SWINDLER, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRIMATES 56 (1998) ("In contrast
to most prosimians and all but two species of monkeys, apes lack tails.").
27. See SWINDLER, supra note 26, at 56; B.E. Schwimmer, Pongids (Oct. 1998), at
http://www.umanitoba.calanthropology/courses/121/primatology/pongid.htmi (last visited
Sept. 9, 2001).
28. B.E. Schwimmer, Hominids (Oct. 1998), at http://www.umanitoba.ca/
anthropology/courses/121/primatology/hominid.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2001). Also
included in the superfamily "hominids" are the Hylobatidae which include gibbons. B.E.
Schwimmer, Hylobatidae (Oct. 1998), at http://www.umanitoba.ca/anthropology/courses/
[Vol. 54:163
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The placement of humans and great apes into different biological families
is a source of some disagreement. Gorillas and chimpanzees, for example, are
great apes, while, traditionally, humans are not. Yet, according to most
analyses, whether biochemical, morphological, or genomic, chimpanzees have
a closer relationship to humans than they do to gorillas.29 Furthermore,
because humans are, in evolutionary terms, more closely related to
chimpanzees and gorillas than either of those species is to orangutans (which
are also "great apes"), some claim it is incorrect to separate the family
containing great apes from the family containing humans. 30 Evolutionary
biologist Richard Dawkins indicates that "[t]here is no natural category that
includes chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans but excludes humans. '31 For
such reasons, proponents of the Great Ape Project treat humans, along with
chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans as great apes.
Primate evolutionary history is certainly very interesting to consider. But
clearly its implications for the moral and legal treatment of our closely related
kin is limited. Perhaps this history only demonstrates that the uniquely
important features of human beings evolved in, say, the last million years. If
taxonomists chose to classify animals based on their intelligence, it is rather
clear that humans would be substantially distanced from the other apes.
A similar skepticism might surround the oft-cited finding that human and
chimpanzee DNA are more than 98% identical. 32 Does this information show
that humans and apes are extraordinarily similar in biological terms? Or, does
it show that a 2% difference in a DNA sequence is awfully significant? After
all, genetically, humans are 99.99% identical to each other,33 yet differences
among humans are far from trivial. Similarly, recent findings by the Human
Genome Project show that the number of distinct human genes is far closer to
121/primatology/hylobatid.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2001).
29. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAMMALS, supra note 26, at 128.
30. For example, evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins writes that "[o]ur common
ancestor with the chimpanzees and gorillas is much more recent than their common ancestor
with the Asian apes-the gibbons and the orang-utans." Richard Dawkins, Gaps in the Mind,
in THE GREAT APE PROJECT, supra note 24, at 80, 82.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., WISE, supra note 5, at 132 ("Our DNA and that of chimpanzees is more
than 98.3 percent identical. Of the DNA that actually does something, humans and
chimpanzees share, on average, more than... 99.5 percent [of that DNA]."). Wise is
alluding to the difference between coding and non-coding regions of DNA. Coding regions
of DNA tell cells what proteins to produce but represent only a small portion of total DNA.
Non-coding regions contain both "junk" DNA and DNA that switches coding regions on and
off. Thus, saying that we share a certain percentage of DNA with another species could
more accurately be rephrased as '"We share X% of our coding regions, Y% of our non-
coding junk regions, and Z% of our non-coding regulatory regions." Email from Robert
Sapolsky, Professor of Biological Sciences and of Neurology and Neurological Sciences,
Stanford University (July 10, 2001, 10:41:54 PDT) (on file with author).




the number of distinct genes in other species than was commonly thought.34
While an important discovery, such findings cannot place a value on the
differences that are actually observed. At best, DNA evidence and
evolutionary history can help remind us of our place in the universe. They
remind us that nature does not carve a sharp dividing line between humans and
the rest of the animal kingdom.
B. Great Ape Cognitive Abilities
In this brief section, I can only offer a small flavor of the skills and abilities
of great apes. These stories are undeniably anecdotal, as is much of the
literature on the subject. There are a few reasons for this. First, those who
study great ape cognition are inclined to do so because they perceive the depth
and breadth of great ape abilities. These same people are also unlikely to
subject great apes to the more scientifically rigorous, though often less humane,
kinds of experiments which would give us more confidence in our
understanding. Nevertheless, when it comes to assessing the abilities of some
being and what is at stake is the kind of treatment the being should receive, I
believe it is appropriate to be somewhat charitable in our interpretations. The
price of overstating the abilities of great apes is that they receive more
protection than is minimally required. The price of understating their abilities
may be to subject them to cruel and painful treatment which they recognize as
such and perceive in ways that are not radically different than we would
perceive the same treatment.
The biblical notion that humans and animals are radically different beings
was modified dramatically by the Darwinian revolution nearly a century and a
half ago. Darwin declared that any differences between the minds of humans
and the minds of higher animals were "certainly one of degree and not kind." 35
We now know that all of the great apes can communicate symbolically with
humans and sometimes with each other.36 Great apes can recognize their own
images in mirrors, which has led some to claim that they are uniquely self-
reflective.37 There is recent evidence that dolphins can also pass a mirror self-
recognition test,38 but other intelligent animals like monkeys, gibbons, and
elephants "have the intelligence to use a mirror's reflection to find hidden food,
and can recognize other individuals reflected in it, but never themselves. 39
34. Tom Abate, Genome Discovery Shocks Scientists, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 2001, at
Al.
35. CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 105
(John Tyler Bonner & Robert M. May eds., Princeton Univ. Press, 1981) (1871).
36. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAMMALS, supra note 26, at 130.
37. See id.
38. Mark Derr, Brainy Dolphins Pass the Human 'Mirror' Test, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2001, at D3.
39. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAMMALS, supra note 26, at 130.
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1. Language and lust-the orangutan Rinnie.
Birute Galdikas, a former student of famed paleontologist Louis Leakey,
has been studying orangutans for nearly thirty years, mostly on the island of
Borneo. In an interview with the New York Times, Galdikas was asked
whether orangutans can learn language. She replied:
I think orangutans can learn how to use language at the level of a 3-year-old
child. I had a student in 1978, Gary Shapiro, who came to Camp Leakey and
he taught an adult female, Rinnie, sign language. He could not believe how
fast she learned it. Rinnie took the tutoring personally. One day, Rinnie took
Gary by the hand and tried to seduce him. Gary pushed her away. She
thereafter lost all interest in signing.
40
The story suggests that orangutans can, to some extent, learn to communicate
through sign language and can develop interpersonal connections with humans.
A generous interpretation of the story would take it to show that orangutans can
engage in long-term planning (for example, perhaps Rinnie had been waiting to
make her move until the right time) and that orangutans have long-term
memories (such that Gary's refusal to accept Rinnie's offer led to an ongoing
grudge in which Rinnie refused to communicate further in sign language). A
more skeptical conception of orangutan abilities might take the story to
illustrate that orangutans do not so much learn language as engage in behaviors
for which they perceive rewards (for example, sexual gratification) and that
they cease those behaviors when perceived rewards disappear.4i Let us
remember though that the dangers of anthropomorphism work in two
directions. We must also be careful not to create artificial differences between
humans and apes where none actually exists.4 2
2. Long term memory-the chimpanzee Washoe.
Chimpanzees are usually considered our closest kin among nonhuman
animals. Chimpanzees "regularly walk bipedally in the wild" and they "use
40. Claudia Dreifus, Scientist at Work/Birute Galdikas: Saving the Orangutan,
Preserving Paradise, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 21, 2000, at F3. Famed paleontologist Louis Leakey
recruited three young women in the 1960's to study great apes, including Dr. Galdikas. The
other two were Dr. Jane Goodall, who discovered that chimpanzees made and used tools,
and Dr. Dian Fossey, who lived and died among the gorillas of Rwanda and was played by
Sigoumey Weaver in the film Gorillas in the Mist. Id.
41. Or, such a view might challenge the accuracy of the anecdote, suggesting that that
those who spend their lives studying animals are prone to anthropomorphize their research
subjects.
42. Frans de Waal, an expert in primate behavior, has collected evidence indicating
that apes can transmit cultural knowledge. See FRANS DE WAAL, THE APE AND THE SUSHI
MASTER 28 (2001) ("The standard notion of humanity as the only form of life to have made
the step from the natural to the cultural realm-as if one day we opened a door to a brand-
new life-is in urgent need of correction.").
Oct. 2001]
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tools for various purposes."'43  Washoe was the first chimpanzee to
communicate with humans in sign language.44  She has also provided
remarkable evidence of the ability of chimpanzees to retain long-term
memories. Washoe was raised by Allen and Beatrice Gardner who began
teaching her American Sign Language.45 At five-years-old, Washoe left the
care of the Gardners in order to be transferred to a primate institute. There was
an eleven-year period in which she was separated from the Gardners.46 When
the Gardners made a surprise visit to Washoe after the eleven-year hiatus,
Washoe remembered and spontaneously "signed their name signs." 47 Then,
"Washoe signed 'COME MRS G"' to Beatrice Gardner "and led her into an
adjoining room and began to play a game with her that she had not been
observed to play since she was a five-year-old .... - 48 That chimpanzees can
have such long-term memories suggests the possibility that they can have a
fairly broad conception of a life. It certainly doesn't follow automatically that
they do, but it gives us reason to think that they do not live merely from day-to-
day but can reflect on events of the past and probably of the future.
3. Human-like qualities-the bonobo Kanzi
Closely related to chimpanzees are bonobos, formerly known as "pygmy
chimpanzees." Harvard biology professor Edward Wilson tells the story of his
first meeting with Kanzi, a young bonobo at the Language Research Center at
Georgia State University. When the two first met, Wilson writes, "Kanzi
reached out and touched my hand, nervously but gently, and stepped back a
short distance to study me again."'49 Wilson was then given a cup of grape
juice and continues, "I flourished a cup as if offering a toast and took a sip,
whereupon Kanzi climbed into my lap, took the cup, and drank most of the
juice.... Afterward everyone in the group had a good time playing ball and a
game of chase with Kanzi."'50 On the surface, nothing about the story is so
remarkable. What is remarkable, however, is the impression Kanzi made on
Wilson:
The episode was unnerving. It wasn't the same as making friends with the
neighbor's dog. I had to ask myself: was this really an animal? As Kanzi was
led away (no farewells), I realized that I had responded to him almost exactly
43. Adriaan Kortlandt, Spirits Dressed in Furs?, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT, supra
note 24, at 137, 142.
44. Roger S. Fouts & Deborah H. Fouts, Chimpanzees' Use of Sign Language, in THE
GREAT APE PROJECT, supra note 24, at 28, 28.
45. WISE, supra note 5, at 219.
46. Fouts & Fouts, supra note 44, at 37.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 38.
49. EDWARD 0. WILSON, BIOPHILIA 129 (1984).
50. Id.
[Vol. 54:163
STANDING OF HUMANS AND APES
as I would to a two-year old child-same initial anxieties, same urge to
communicate and please, same gestures and food-sharing ritual.... I was
pleased that I had been accepted, that I had proved adequately human (was
that the word?) and sensitive enough to get along with Kanzi. 51
Once again, this story could be interpreted merely to show that Wilson overly
anthropomorphizes bonobos. Such first hand accounts are naturally limited in
their ability to convince skeptics. Yet, his almost indescribable feeling was that
he was interacting more with a child than with a pet. Such stories are not
uncommon.52 Given that most of us will not have the opportunity to have such
interactions with great apes, we should give some weight to these stories
barring evidence to the contrary.
4. Language and mourning-the gorilla Koko.
Koko is a gorilla who learned elements of sign language at Stanford
University as part of Francine Patterson's psychology dissertation in the early
1970's. 53 Today, Koko is said to have advanced further with language than
any nonhuman.54 Koko has a working vocabulary of over 1000 signs and
understands approximately 2000 words of spoken English.55 Koko "laughs at
her own jokes and those of others. She cries when hurt or left alone.... [She]
talks about her feelings, using words like 'happy', 'sad', 'afraid', 'enjoy',
'eager', 'frustrate', 'mad' and, quite frequently, 'love'. '56 While most of us
will not interact directly with great apes, we can watch them on videotape.
Many of these behaviors have been documented on the Nature program, "A
Conversation with Koko. '57
Francine Patterson, still Koko's trainer, has helped to make Koko the most
famous great ape of all, becoming the first gorilla to participate in an online
chat session.58 Koko has also appeared on the cover of Life magazine, where
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Douglas Adams & Mark Carwardine, Meeting a Gorilla, in THE GREAT
APE PROJECT, supra note 24, at 19-23; Adriaan Kortlandt, supra note 43, at 137-44; Geza
Teleki, They Are Us, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT, supra note 24, at 296-302.
53. Nature: A Conversation with Koko (PBS), available at http://www.koko.org (last
visited Sept. 9, 2001).
54. The Gorilla Foundation, Koko's World (2000), at http://www.koko.org/world (last
visited Sept. 9, 2001).
55. Francine Patterson & Wendy Gordon, The Case for the Personhood of Gorillas, in
THE GREAT APE PROJECT, supra note 24, at 58.
56. Id. at 59.
57. Conversation with Koko, supra note 53. Once again, of course, the criticism is
open to us that the video does not show all of the times that Koko makes unintelligible
remarks or behaves in otherwise unremarkable ways.
58. Press Release, America Online, Business Wire (Nov. 27, 2000). For better or
worse, the press release also indicates that Koko is participating in a webcast to "children
and netizens about her plans to celebrate" the holiday season and that Koko "has recently
joined the e-commerce revolution by shopping online with her caregiver." Id.
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she is pictured cuddling-with a pet cat that she named "All-Ball. ' 59 All-Ball
was hit by a car and killed, and Koko is reported to have grieved when told of
the accident.60 More recently, a gorilla named Michael, who had been Koko's
companion for 24 years died of natural causes. In the weeks after Michael
died, Koko "uttered frequent, mournful cries, particularly at night." 61 She
purportedly did not want to be left alone and "indicated with sign language that
she wanted a light left on at night when she went to bed."62
C. Laws Protecting Great Apes
As indicated above, some countries, including Great Britain and New
Zealand have already enacted strong protections for great apes that are geared
toward apes as individuals. 63 Laws in the United States are significantly less
protective, particularly in the area of biomedical research, in part because, as
we shall see later, the laws are underenforced. In this section, I describe some
of the state, federal, and international protections that apply to great apes.
Legal protection for animals is largely based on the idea that they are the
property of humans, and they are protected in much the same way and for
many of the same reasons that inanimate property is protected. 64 Regardless of
the purposes of the laws protecting animals, it would seem, at least from the
legal language protecting animals, that the law does provide some significant
protections. Most states have common law or statutory protections against
animal cruelty that apply to great apes as they do to other animals. 65 Many
states prohibit depriving an animal in one's care of "food, water, and shelter"
or of "necessary sustenance." For example, New York law considers it cruelty
to animals to deprive "any animal of necessary sustenance, food or drink, or
[to] neglect to furnish it such sustenance or drink."66 It also provides that an
impounded or confined animal must be provided with "wholesome air, food,
shelter, and water."'67 Many states also have provisions against abandonment s
59. Conversation with Koko, supra note 53.
60. See id.; Patterson & Gordon, supra note 55, at 59.
61. The Gorilla Foundation, Koko's Mourning for Michael (Aug. 2, 2000), at
http://www.koko.org/world/mouming-koko.html (last visited Sept. 9,2001).
62. Id.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
64. See, e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 3-14 (1995). It
has also been pointed out that the notion of animals as property may offer the most
promising means of maintaining and expanding animal protections. See Posner, supra note
8, at 539.
65. The following state law citations and many others are well-documented in
FRANCIONE, supra note 64, at 121.
66. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAw § 353 (McKinney 1991).
67. Id. at § 356.
68. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §45-8-211(l)(d)(1993).
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and poisoning.69 South Dakota, as an example, requires provisions for sanitary
living conditions, 70 and Vermont mandates that animals be transported
humanely. 71 California is said to have some of the toughest laws against
cruelty to animals. 72 Aside from provisions prohibiting intentional maiming,
torturing, wounding, and killing of animals, it imposes liability on those who
negligently or without culpable state of mind, overwork, overload, torture, or
kill animals.73 Importantly, however, state law protections generally do not
apply to the use of animals for food and food production or the use of animals
for medical or scientific purposes.74
There are a number of major federal statutes that protect animals.75 The
one most concerned with animal welfare and animal cruelty is the federal
Animal Welfare Act (AWA).76 The AWA provides federal protections for
animals from some forms of cruelty and mistreatment.77 By statute, the
Secretary of Agriculture is required to issue "standards to govern the humane
handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers, research
facilities, and exhibitors. '78  These standards are supposed to include
"minimum requirements" governing the "handling, housing, feeding, watering,
sanitation, ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and temperatures,
[and] adequate veterinary care"'79 of animals. Importantly for the law
governing great apes, a provision mandates minimum requirements "for a
physical environment adequate to promote the psychological well-being of
primates."'80 There are no psychological well-being provisions for dogs, cats,
or horses. 81
69. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. §711-1109(1)(b)(1988).
70. S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. §40-1-2.3 (Mitchie 1991).
71. 13 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 352(a)(4), (10) (Supp. 1992).
72. FRANCIONE, supra note 64, at 119.
73. CAL. PENAL CODE §597(b) (West Supp. 1993).
74. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102.1(C) (West 1986) (stating that certain
Louisiana animal cruelty statutes do not apply to "activities carried on for scientific or
medical research governed by accepted standards").
75. See, e.g., Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (2001); Animal Welfare
Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2001); Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §
668-668d (2001); Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(2001); Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (2001); Dolphin
Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2001); Endangered Species Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2001).
76. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2001).
77. Id.
78. Id. § 2143(a)(1).
79. Id. § 2143(a)(2)(A).
80. Id. § 2143(a)(2)(B); see also Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Sec'y of Agric., 813
F. Supp. 882, 886 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
81. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (With Notes on Animal Rights), 47
UCLA L. REv. 1333, 1342 (2000).
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Under the psychological well-being provisions, the Secretary of
Agriculture has promulgated regulations to require "dealers, exhibitors, and
research facilities" to "develop, document, and follow" a plan to promote the
psychological well-being of primates. 82 These plans must address primate
"social grouping" 83 and opportunities for "environmental enrichment"
including, for example, opportunities to use "perches, swings, mirrors, and
other increased cage complexities."' 84 For great apes weighing over 110 lbs.
(50 kg), regulations rather vaguely require "additional opportunities to express
species-typical behavior." 85 Details of what plans should contain are virtually
absent, except to say that the plan should accord with "professional standards
as cited in appropriate professional journals or reference guides, and as directed
by the attending veterinarian. ' 86 Many critics have argued that the regulations
are inadequate because they delegate responsibility for promoting primate well-
being to those being regulated and to the veterinarians in their employ.87 In
Part III, we will return to this provision in the context of Animal Legal Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Glickman,88 a groundbreaking case in animal law and an
important case in its own right for the doctrine of standing.
Aside from weaknesses in the substantive provisions of the AWA, it has
typically been underenforced. 89 This may have something to do with the fact
that, before the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) was assigned
responsibility for enforcing the AWA, the department "dealt primarily with the
production, treatment, and slaughter of food animals." 90 To the dismay of
many animal activists, the AWA does not regulate animals used for food or
clothing.91  Also, although the AWA may apply to animals used for
experimental purposes before or after the conduct of experiments, the AWA
states that "nothing in this chapter shall be construed as authorizing the
Secretary to promulgate rules, regulations, or orders with regard to design,
outlines, guidelines, or performance of actual research or experimentation by a
research facility as determined by such research facility."92
82. 9 C.F.R. § 3.81 (2000).
83. Id.. § 3.81(a).
84. Id. § 3.81(b).
85. Id. § 3.81(c)(5).
86. Id. § 3.81.
87. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 439 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (finding that "placing such broad and unguarded discretion in the hands of the
veterinarian in the exhibitor's own employ is an insufficient safeguard to protect primate
well-being").
88. 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
89. See notes 157-158 infra and accompanying text.
90. FRANCIONE, supra note 64, at 211.
91. "In fact, no federal statute regulates the treatment of animals used for food or food
production on farms .... ." Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1342.
92. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6)(A)(i) (2001). Section 2143(a)(6)(ii) applies this same
prohibition to rules, regulations, or orders "with regard to the performance of actual research
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State and federal laws on animal welfare are supposed to reflect both direct
and indirect duties to animals. A direct duty to an animal is one we have
because the animal itself has some interest, for example, to be nourished and
avoid torture. An indirect duty to an animal is one we have by virtue of our
relationship to other humans. For example, if we ban animal torture because
animal torture encourages perverse human sentiments and thereby increases
human suffering, then we have an indirect duty to protect animals by virtue of
our relationship to other humans. Elements of both kinds of duties can be seen
in our legal regime, though they may be hard to distinguish when a law's
purpose is not clearly stated.
As long ago as 1892 in Hunt v. State,93 an animal protection statute was
said to protect animals by helping to develop "a humane regard for the rights
and feelings of the brute creation by reproving evil and indifferent tendencies
in human nature in its intercourse with animals." 94 The quote reflects direct
duties to animals (their "rights") as well as indirect duties that stem from a
desire to reduce cruel tendencies in people.95 In contrast, the protection of
endangered species as such does not provide for direct duties to animals. For
example, the Endangered Species Act declares that threatened and endangered
species are of "aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and
scientific value to the Nation and its people."96 Distinctly lacking from direct
consideration, however, are the animals themselves. At best, the Endangered
Species Act provides for direct duties to animal species.
Nevertheless, because human activities have made all of the great apes
endangered, 97 it happens that some of the strongest great ape protections come
from the Endangered Species Act and related protections. The Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)
oversees a large multinational treaty, to which the U.S. is a signatory, that has
"drastically diminished the export of many species-including great apes-
from their native habitats, though illegal shipments occur."98  Endangered
species protections mean that great apes are generally not used in dangerous
experiments in the United States, although captive-bred chimpanzees may be
used under some circumstances.99
or experimentation." Id. at § 2143(a)(6)(ii).
93. 29 N.E. 933 (Ind. App. 1892) (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 933.
95. For evidence that anticruelty laws do not, in fact, reflect direct duties to animals,
see FRANCIONE, supra note 64, at 4, 17-33.
96. Endangered Species Act of 1973, § (2)(a)(3) (1973).
97. Species considered threatened and endangered can be found at:
http://endangered.fws.gov (last visited Sept. 9, 2001). All of the nonhuman great apes,
including gorillas, orangutans, bonobos, and chimpanzees are considered endangered in their
natural habitats. Chimpanzees, however, are in the less protected category of "threatened
species" when held in captivity outside of their natural range. Ma2
98. Cantor, supra note 24, at 280.
99. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAMMALS, supra note 26, at 131.
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D. The Great Ape Project
In 1993, a book called The Great Ape Project was published. Edited by
Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, the book begins with "A Declaration on Great
Apes" (the "Declaration") that describes the principle goal of the editors and
contributors to the book-namely, to establish certain basic moral and legal
rights for great apes. 100 Thirty-six people contributed to the book including
philosopher Peter Singer, primatologist Jane Goodall, evolutionary biologist
Richard Dawkins, and novelist Douglas Adams. The book, The Great Ape
Project, led to the creation of an international organization with the same name
"founded to work for the removal of the nonhuman great apes from the
category of property, and for their immediate inclusion within the category of
persons."10 1
The Great Ape Project's Declaration begins by identifying a class of
beings said to be in "the community of equals." It asserts that the community
of equals should, at a minimum, include all great apes: humans, chimpanzees,
bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans. 102 According to the Declaration, the
community of equals "is the moral community within which we accept certain
basic moral principles or rights as governing our relations with each other and
enforceable at law." 103 By its terms, the Declaration is intended to promote
both a moral and a legal position that is not intended to be merely a statement
of theoretical moral philosophy.' 04
100. The Great Ape Project, A Declaration on Great Apes, in The Great Ape Project,
supra note 24, at 4-7 (hereinafter Declaration].
101. The Great Ape Project International, GAP-FAQ (Oct. 22, 1996), at
http://www.greatapeproject.orglgapfaq.html.#Sectionl_l (last visited Sept. 9, 2001). The
Great Ape Legal Project is a joint effort between the Great Ape Project International and the
Animal Legal Defense Fund. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Great Ape Legal Project, at
http'//www.aldf.org/chimp.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2001).
102. Declaration, supra note 100, at 4. Bonobos were originally thought to be "pygmy
chimpanzees." Primatologists recently recognized them as a distinct species, and the Great
Ape Project subsequently recognized them as an independent kind of great ape meant to be
incorporated into the "community of equals." See The Great Ape Project International,
GAP-FAQ (Oct. 22, 1996), at http://www.greatapeproject.orggapfaq.html#Section5_ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2001).
103. Declaration, supra note 100, at 4. Notice too that the Declaration speaks in terms
of "principles or rights." This is probably a compromise among those writers who would
speak in terms of great ape rights and those utilitarians, like Peter Singer, who prefer to
speak in terms of more flexible principles. For conciseness, I will call them principles.
Singer writes, "The language of rights is a convenient political shorthand. It is even more
valuable in the era of thirty-second TV news clips than it was in Bentham's day; but in the
argument for a radical change in our attitude to animals, it is in no way necessary." PETER
SINGER, ANimALLIBERATION 8 (2d ed. 1990).
104. In fact, Peter Singer, a leader in the efforts of the Great Ape Project, is often cited
by Richard Posner as one of few academic moral philosophers who emphasizes creative
"moral entrepreneurship" over the sometimes cold and calculating moral theorizing of which
Posner is quite critical. See POSNER, supra note 20, at 43 n.67, 84 (1999) (discussing
academic moralism).
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The Declaration highlights three principles to protect great apes. They
include a right to life, a right to be free from unlawful confinement, and a
general prohibition on torture. The Project's right to life provides: "The lives
of members of the community of equals are to be protected. Members of the
community of equals may not be killed except in very strictly defined
circumstances, for example, self-defence."10 5 Euthanasia is probably also an
excusing circumstance for taking a great apes' life, at least for many members
of the Project, and it would be interesting to know what else would qualify.
For example, the Project is silent about capital punishment; undoubtedly, it
would oppose capital punishment of nonhuman apes, since nonhuman apes are
not sufficiently responsible for their actions to have any sort of criminal
liability.10 6
Attributions of criminal liability to animals, however, were once rather
widespread. From the Ninth Century to as recently as the Nineteenth Century,
animals throughout Europe and elsewhere were put on trial and held
responsible for a variety of crimes,10 7 sometimes punishable by death. E. P.
Evans' classic book on the subject, The Criminal Prosecution and Capital
Punishment of Animals, recounts the following story:
On the 5th of September, 1379, as two herds of swine, one belonging to the
commune and the other to the priory of Saint-Marcel-le-Jeussey were feeding
together near that town, three sows of the communal herd, excited and
enraged by the squealing of one of the porklings, rushed upon Perrinot Muet,
the son of the swinekeeper, and before his father could come to his rescue,
threw him to the ground and so severely injured him that he died soon
afterwards. The three sows, after due process of law, were condemned to
death; and as both the herds had hastened to the scene of the murder and by
their cries and aggressive actions showed that they approved of the assault,
and were ready and even eager to become participes criminis, they were
arrested as accomplices and sentenced by the court to suffer the same
penalty.108
Cases like this were featured in a 1993 Miramax film, The Advocate, which
portrays a country lawyer in Fifteenth Century Europe who has a substantial
practice defending animals charged with crimes.10 9 As ludicrous as these
stories sound to our modem sensibilities, they remind us of the dangers of
anthropomorphizing animals by attributing thoughts and motivations which are
105. Declaration, supra note 100, at 4.
106. See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, Personhood, Property, and Legal Competence, in
THE GREAT APE PROJECT, supra note 24, at 256. Also, it is clear that a very "strictly
defined" research protocol calling for the killing and dissection of a laboratory chimpanzee
would not qualify as an excusing circumstance in the minds of many Project proponents.
107. See Paul Schiff Berman, Rats, Pigs, and Statues on Trial: The Creation of
Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals and Inanimate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 288,289; see also E.P. EvANs, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
OF ANIMALS (Faber & Faber 1988) (1906).
108. EvANs, supra note 107, at 144.
109. THE ADVOCATE (Miramax, 1993).
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beyond their capabilities. Great Ape Project proponents, however, would
remind us that animals are helpless victims of whatever policies and practices
humans have toward them. In any event, our history of animal trials at least
reminds us that our understanding of animal capacities affects the ways that we
treat them. It also reminds us, as will be relevant in Part In, that the notion that
a particular nonhuman animal can have its day in court is not quite so foreign
as it now seems-in fact, it was once rather commonplace. "10
The second principle of the Great Ape Project is the protection of
individual liberty, meant to keep great apes out of laboratory cages and most
zoo environrients:
Members of the community of equals are not to be arbitrarily deprived of their
liberty; if they should be imprisoned without due legal process, they have the
right to immediate release. The detention of those who have not been
convicted of any crime, or of those who are not criminally liable, should be
allowed only where it can be shown to be for their own good, or necessary to
protect the public from a member of the community who would clearly be a
danger to others if at liberty. In such cases, members of the community of
equals must have the right to appeal, either directly or, if they lack the relevant
capacity, through an advocate, to a judicial tribunal. 11 1
As it is worded, this principle would seem to apply more to humans than to
other great apes. After all, what legal process would be engaged in to
determine if a nonhuman ape should be imprisoned? With respect to
nonhuman animals, and that is certainly its implicit focus, the principle is
designed to preclude keeping great apes in small cages in research laboratories
and zoos. With respect to zoos, the Project:
oppose[s] the keeping of apes in situations designed primarily for the benefit
of human beings who observe them (zoos). Wherever possible, great apes
should be released from captivity into a habitat where they can live freely.
When this is not possible, we accept as an interim measure the provision of
sanctuaries for great apes who cannot be returned to natural conditions.
Individuals living provisionally in these sanctuaries must have the opportunity
to remove themselves from humans as they please, and humans visiting them
should be educated in the right of apes to live their own lives. 112
110. This is not meant to downplay the very important distinction between trying an
animal for a criminal offense and giving an animal standing to sue, by way of a human
guardian, under an existing animal protection statute.
111. Declaration, supra note 100, at 4.
112. The Great Ape Project International, GAP-FAQ (Oct. 22, 1996), at
http:llwww.greatapeproject.orggapfaq.html#Section3_3 (last visited Sept. 9, 2001). It goes
on to say:
We accept that, for reasons given above, or because they have been infected with a
contagious disease, there may be some individuals who will never be able to live freely or in
a group. In such cases, they should be provided with the space, facilities and opportunities
for non-tactile interaction with others of their kind, or with humans, that best corresponds to
their individual needs and interests.
A guardian or guardians should be appointed to represent the interests of nonhuman apes
living in sanctuaries or other human-controlled environments. In particular cases, guardians
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The protection of individual liberty is also meant to preclude keeping great
apes in laboratory cages. The Great Ape Project is replete with stories of apes
that are caged in areas which are too small and poorly kept with fecal material
caked on to bars and sides of cages. 113 Current law provides that primates
should be kept under humane conditions but keeps the standard for humane
treatment far below that sought by the Project. 14
The third and final explicitly stated "right or principle" in the Declaration
is a prohibition on torture: "The deliberate infliction of severe pain on a
member of the community of equals, either wantonly or for an alleged benefit
to others, is regarded as torture, and is wrong." 115  Much like the second
principle which applies to animal liberties, this principle is designed to protect
animals from suffering. In all likelihood, this principle is somewhat more
focused on the conduct of biomedical experimentation on great apes. It
suggests that pain cannot be inflicted on great apes for what is merely an
"alleged benefit." Yet, the benefits from animal experimentation would seem
to be more than just "alleged." Perhaps the benefits from great ape
experimentation, when involving significant pain to great apes, are presumed to
be merely "alleged." Biomedical experimentation may be an area where
Project contributors had some disagreement. Adrian Kortlandt, a professor of
animal psychology and ethology offered the following ambivalent discussion
of experimentation on apes:
I am aware, of course, that living and sometimes non-anesthetized subjects are
needed in certain biomedical experimentation aiming to alleviate the suffering
of humans. Those who have seen what is going on inside a hospital, and those
who have lost a loved one owing to the impotence of medical science, will
understand what I mean. I myself have seen some heart-breaking research in
primate centres, particularly in the psychological and psychiatric field.
However, as a student of psychology I have also seen enough in mental wards
to appreciate the value of such research. On the other hand, how can we
justify such research with our innocent ape cousins, while doing so is not
allowed even with those humans who are guilty of the most horrifying crimes
against humanity? 116
may approve limitation of their fertility, so that apes will not have to live in unacceptable
conditions indefinitely.
It must be decided in each case whether it is best for individual great apes to be brought to
sanctuaries or to remain where they are. Considerations such as available housing, stress
created by the presence of humans, and existing bonds with caretakers will affect this
decision.
In the rare cases that they do remain in the zoo, because it is in their own best interests, the
priority in the power relationship should be given to the interests of the nonhuman apes. If
they can voluntarily place themselves in view of the public, there should be a sign clearly
saying that these are the last generation of great apes in zoo captivity.
Id.
113. Cantor, supra note 24, at 283.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 64-80.
115. Declaration, supra note 100, at 4.
116. Kortlandt, supra note 43, at 142.
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In any event, the principle prohibiting torture would, at least, go well beyond
our current protections for animals involved in lab experiments who, as
discussed, currently have very few protections. 117
Lastly, to avoid the criticism that the Great Ape Project draws an arbitrary
cutoff line around great apes that leaves the rest of the primate and animal
kingdom to the ravages of mankind, the Declaration remains agnostic as to
whether or not other animals deserve the same protections that are demanded
for great apes. The Declaration, reflecting the diversity of opinions among its
contributors, says:
No doubt some of us, speaking individually, would want to extend the
community of equals to many other animals as well; others may consider that
extending the community to include all great apes is as far as we should go at
present. We leave the consideration of that question for another occasion. 118
In Part II, we will explore the philosophical foundations of the Great Ape
Project to help understand whether the interests of all animals should be treated
equally or if those of human and nonhuman apes may be entitled to greater
consideration.
II. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
The Great Ape Project speaks with many voices in its exposition of the
philosophical basis for extending rights to great apes. The explanation which is
most widely cited and discussed comes from Peter Singer, currently a professor
of bioethics at Princeton University. For Singer, human and nonhuman
animals have interests if they have the ability to experience pains or pleasures.
Singer cites an oft-quoted passage from Jeremy Bentham indicating that, when
it comes to animals, "[tjhe question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk?
but, Can they suffer?"'119 Singer calls beings with the capacity to experience
pleasures and pains "sentient," though he acknowledges that this is a special,
narrow use of the term. The class of sentient beings includes humans, apes,
monkeys, dogs, pigs, horses, rabbits, chickens, and more. Excluded from this
category are non-sentient entities like rocks, trees, and computers as well as
lower organisms like insects and bacteria. 120 While Justice Douglas suggested,
in the context of environmental law, that legal standing might profitably be
117. See supra text accompanying note 92.
118. Declaration, supra note 100, at 5.
119. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, supra note 103, at 7 (quoting Jeremy Bentham).
Bentham's articulation of utilitarianism locates moral value, ultimately, in the mental states
of sentient beings. As such, it is subject to Robert Nozick's critique of mental state theories
of the good. See ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974); see also
J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILrrARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 19-22 (1973). For reasons to question the force of Nozick's critique, see Adam
Kolber, Mental Statism and the Experience Machine, 3 BARD J. OF Soc. Scl. 10 (1994/1995).
120. Singer can confidently respond in the negative to Richard Epstein's slippery slope
challenge, "Would even bacteria have rights?" Glaberson, supra note 6.
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granted to "the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded, '121
Singer need take no such view on the matter, as rivers, streams, and canyons
are not sentient beings.
Singer rightly observes that most animals are capable of feeling pain.
Although only humans and some nonhuman apes are capable of telling us that
they are in pain, "[n]early all the external signs that lead us to infer pain in
other humans can be seen in other species .... -122 Singer notes that although
pain "can never [directly] be observed," 1 3 its "behavioral signs include
writhing, facial contortions, moaning, yelping or other forms of calling,
attempts to avoid the source of pain, appearance of fear at the prospect of its
repetition, and so on." 124 And though we cannot have absolute certainty that
even our human friends feel pain, "none of us has the slightest real doubt that
our close friends feel pain just as we do." 125
Importantly for Singer, the capacity to experience pleasure and pain "is not
just another characteristic like the capacity for language, or for higher
mathematics,"' 126 which might arbitrarily determine whether a being's interests
should count. Rather, the "capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a
prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before
we can speak of interests in any meaningful way."'127 Once we understand
Singer's requirement for having an "interest," we can better understand his
structure for resolving conflicts among the interests of different beings.
Singer's principle of equal consideration of interests ("equal consideration")
says that we should "give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like
interests of all those affected by our actions." 128 On this view, because a cow
is sentient, its interests in avoiding painful electric shocks during a scientific
experiment count as strongly as the interests that a chimpanzee or a human has
in avoiding the same amount of pain.
Again, while Singer does not speak for all Project proponents, the language
of equal consideration of interests is readily adopted by the Great Ape Project.
The Declaration says that "a rational ethic has emerged challenging the moral
significance of membership of our own species. This challenge seeks equal
consideration of the interests of all animals, human and nonhuman." 129
Furthermore, were we to give great ape interests in experiencing pleasure and
121. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see
also Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972).
122. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, supra note 103, at 11.
123. Id. at 10.
124. Id. at 11.
125. Id. at 10.
126. Id. at 7.
127. Id. at 7.
128. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 21 (2d ed. 1993).
129. Declaration, supra note 100, at 5 (emphasis added).
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avoiding pain equal consideration to those interests held by humans, we would
likely come to a proposal very much like the Great Ape Project's Declaration
on Great Apes. We would, at a minimum, protect great apes from torture and
unlawful captivity and would, perhaps, allow these protections to be enforced
by guardians acting on behalf of apes.
The Declaration also provides for a right to life. Since a being's life can
(we think) be taken painlessly, Project proponents need an explanation for why
it harms great apes when their lives are taken quickly and painlessly.
Proponents could appeal to the foregone pleasure that the ape would have
experienced had it been allowed to live. This might be sufficient, particularly
if we believe that the ape would lead a pleasant life if left alone.
Singer's answer goes further than that, asserting that great apes can have
interests beyond mere pleasures and pains. A subset of sentient animals,
including great apes, have more sophisticated interests, like interests in
continuing to live in the future.130 The discussion in Part I makes plausible the
notion that some apes can be self-aware, have expectations about the future,
and have memories that extend significantly into the past. When we kill a
being that has an interest in continuing to live in the future, we have done
something worse, all else being equal, than when we kill a being which is
merely sentient, like a fish.
Nothing about the principle of equal consideration of interests implies that
all humans and all animals have identical interests. 131 Some beings have an
interest in life itself and recognizing that only some beings are capable of
having that interest does not violate the principle of equal consideration. Equal
consideration only tells us how to compare the relevantly similar interests of
beings. When beings have different interests, we can compare those interests
only by using our intuitions or by finding some other theoretical basis for
making the comparison.
A. Equal Consideration and Human Equality
Much more needs to be said about how we understand human and
nonhuman interests. However, before critically examining the principle of
equal consideration in the context of nonhuman animals, it is important to see
how the principle can be applied to humans. It is in this context that the
principle holds much of its appeal, and most of those who cite Singer on behalf
of animal rights are making arguments for animals that derive from intuitions
about human equality.
130. SINGER, PRACTICALETHICS, supra note 128, at 90.
131. Animal liberationists are seeking "equal rights" for animals, not "equal
treatment," where equal treatment is understood to mean "identical treatment." See, e.g.,
S.F. SAPONTZIS, MORALS, REASON, AND ANIMALS 78-79 (1987).
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Singer uses the principle of equal consideration to explain remarkably well
many of our beliefs about equality among humans. According to Singer,
human equality is based not on some factual claim of equality but on equality
as an ethical principle. 132 We think that human interests should count equally
regardless of an individual's race, sex, strength, or intelligence. It is not the
case that humans are actually equal in terms of their attributes, but their
attributes are irrelevant to the ways in which their interests should be
considered; humans are equal in the sense that they have interests that deserve
equal moral consideration. Were we to base our principle of equality among
humans on their attributes, we would see that people are plainly not identical in
their abilities and attributes:
Some are tall, some are short; some are good at mathematics, others are poor
at it; some can run 100 metres in ten seconds, some take fifteen or twenty;
some would never intentionally hurt another being, others would kill a
stranger for $100 if they could get away with it.... And so we could go on.
The plain fact is that humans differ, and the differences apply to so many
characteristics that the search for a factual basis on which to erect the principle
of equality seems hopeless. 133
We might admit that not all humans are factually equal but deny that the
factual differences among humans correspond with the typical boundaries
along which human inequalities have typically been drawn (for example, race,
gender, and sexual orientation). So "we can admit that humans differ as
individuals, and yet insist that there are no morally significant differences
between the races and sexes."' 134 Nevertheless, Singer thinks that empirical
arguments for equality along gender and racial lines are insufficient to refute
the suggestion that, for example, everyone should be given an IQ test and those
with the higher scores shall rule over those with the lower scores.135 This sort
of inegalitarianism is not refuted by arguments which say that humans are
factually equal since such inegalitarianism is based on genuine (though
irrelevant) differences. Singer writes, "We can reject this 'hierarchy of
intelligence' and similar fantastic schemes only if we are clear that the claim to
equality does not rest on the possession of intelligence, moral personality,
rationality, or similar matters of fact." 136
Singer's rejection of a "hierarchy of intelligence" also serves as a response
to what we might call the "super-human hypothetical." Suppose that aliens
someday land on Earth, and we come to understand that these aliens are far
more intelligent than we are. We are also told that they love the taste of human
flesh, and by the way, would we mind preparing ourselves into sandwiches so
that the invaders may chew on our live flesh? We would all agree that humans
132. SINGER, PRACTICALETHICS, supra note 128, at 21.
133. Id. at 17-18.





should not submit to such treatment merely to satisfy the aliens' gustatory
preferences. Equal consideration gets the right results. Under equal
consideration, no matter how intelligent or artistic or emotionally astute are
these aliens, human interests in avoiding the pain of being eaten alive outweigh
the comparatively minor pleasures the aliens receive from eating us. 137
B. Equal Consideration and Animal Equality
It is, therefore, Singer's view that "[t]here is no logically compelling
reason for assuming that a difference in ability between two people justifies
any difference in the amount of consideration we give to their interests. ' 138
This seems to jibe with the basic structure of our society in which rights are
generally granted to people independently of their abilities. Yet, Singer's
principle which embraces equality among all human beings "cannot be limited
to humans." 139 Racists, on Singer's view, violate equal consideration by giving
more consideration to the interests of members of their own race than to the
interests of those of a different race. 140 Sexists violate equal consideration by
giving more consideration to the interests of those of a particular gender. And,
similarly, those who are speciesist "give greater weight to the interests of
members of their own species when there is a clash between their interests and
the interests of those of other species. '1" 41 In order to avoid "speciesism," 142 the
prejudicial favoring of one species over another, we must treat the similar
interests of all sentient animals equally.
At a time when Africans were enslaved in the British dominions, Jeremy
Bentham wrote:
The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason
why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a
tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs,
the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons
equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What
else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or
perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a fullgrown horse or dog is beyond
comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an
137. Of course, if the aliens had unimaginably strong desires for human flesh or
perhaps required it in order to live, the hypothetical becomes more tricky and represents a
classic challenge to utilitarianism.
138. Id. at 20-21.
139. Id. at 55.
140. Id. at 58.
141. Id.
142. This term is usually credited to Richard Ryder. See Richard Ryder, Sentientism,
in THE GREAT APE PROJECT, supra note 24, at 220, 220. However, the term was popularized
by Peter Singer. Can animals be speciesist against humans? The idea is parodied in Animal
Farm's reference to "Four legs good; two legs bad." See GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 40
(1946).
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infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they were
otherwise, what would it avail? 14 3
As Singer reads Bentham, there is no "insuperable line' that distinguishes
human and nonhuman animals. Singer is concerned with the utility of
satisfying interests irrespective of the interest-holder. As long as a being has
interests (which it will if it can experience pleasure or pain), the principle of
equal consideration says that those interests weigh equally against the same
kinds of interests of other beings. For Singer, the relevantly similar interests of
humans and livestock animals, for example, are equally considered. When a
human interest in tasty food is compared with a cow's interest in avoiding the
pain of slaughter, Singer finds that the cow's interest is stronger. Our action,
all else being equal, should be guided so as to respect the stronger interest of
the cow over the lesser interest of the human. 144
By demanding equal consideration of the interests of all sentient beings,
Singer asks us to act in a way that is divorced from the current sentiments of
most people. People often favor the interests of those they know over those
they do not and those who remind us of ourselves over those who do not. Such
feelings probably do help explain why we, in fact, favor humans over other
species. Of course, these are exactly the kinds of provincial sentiments Singer
is trying to repudiate.
Still, a potential objection to Singer is that the principle of equal
consideration is too divorced from our actual human sentiments to provide
meaningful guidance to our actions. Richard Posner has made this sort of
challenge,145 noting that human-centered sentiments may be hardwired into our
brains:
The main "reason" why the "philosophical" idea that... talking apes might
have more rights than newborn or profoundly retarded children seems
outlandish and repulsive may simply be that our genes force us to distinguish
between our own and other species and that in this instance disembodied
rational reflection will not overcome feelings rooted in our biology. 146
Furthermore, perhaps if we try to treat the interests of all beings equally, we
will so disperse our concern for others that we erode whatever non-self-serving
interests human nature has granted us.
Singer, of course, believes that we should not let our current emotions dictate
what is right and wrong, especially when these emotions have developed in a
143. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, supra note 103, at 7 (quoting Jeremy Bentham).
144. For criticism of this utilitarian argument when applied in a society-wide context,
see ToM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 220 (1983) and MARK ROWLANDS, ANIMAL
RIGHTS: A PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENCE 84-86 (1998).
145. Posner and Singer recently engaged in a dialogue on animal rights. Richard
Posner & Peter Singer, Dialogue: Animal Rights, SLATE, June 12-15, 2001, available at
http:llslate.msn.comldialogues/0l-06-1 l/dialogues.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2001).
146. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 347-48 (1990); see also
Posner, supra note 64.
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speciesist society. Also, the fact that some people at least try to treat the
interests of "talking apes" as equal to those of humans, suggests that our
biological wiring is not our destiny. Clearly, however, the divide between our
actual sentiments and Singer's theory presents a difficulty for Singer's
position.147
C. Proportional Consideration
A view which more closely matches the views that a lot of people have
toward nonhuman animals takes an animal's interests to be somehow related to
its cognitive capacities. We might think, for example, that the value of a
being's pleasures and pains (and the interests derived from those pleasures and
pains) is in some way proportional to the being's cognitive abilities. Call this
the principle of proportional consideration of interests ("proportional
consideration"). On this view, the value of the experiences of a human and a
baboon and a snake are all different because they have different cognitive
abilities.
We might be led toward a view of proportional consideration if we
understand animal pains and pleasures somewhat differently than does Singer.
Certainly, our uncertainty about the nature of nonhuman experiences leaves
room for disagreement. Though animals surely do feel pain, our confidence in
our abilities to understand and evaluate the experiences of another being drops
off as the being becomes more unlike ourselves. The more different a being is,
the more limited are our inferences about its experiences. I can make better
inferences concerning the experiences of Jimmy Carter than Koko the Gorilla,
though I have met neither of them, because I know that one is a human and one
is a gorilla. I can also make better inferences about the experiences of Koko
than a mouse, because I know that Koko is anatomically more like me than is a
mouse, and Koko is capable of communicating basic information about how
she feels. My inferences are based on a combination of scientific knowledge
(e.g., neuroanatomy and neurochemistry) as well as a perceived recognition of
a being's experiences based on its external behavior including, if possible, a
being's subjective reports of pleasure and pain.
Still these inferences are limited, even when other beings are quite like us.
It is virtually impossible, for example, to know how an opposite-gendered
sexual partner experiences sexual stimulation.14 8 Even if male and female
sexual stimulation creates similar physiological and hormonal responses in
both genders, we know that their different sexual organs mean that men and
women must be having experiences that differ in significant ways.
147. For a discussion of conflict between moral sentiment and moral theory, see Adam
Kolber, The Moral of Moral Luck, 45-66 (1996) (unpublished senior thesis, Princeton
University) (on file with author).
148. Perhaps transgendered people have some knowledge of this sort.
[Vol. 54:163
STANDING OF HUMANS AND APES
Should we think that all animals which experience pain and pleasure,
regardless of species, are experiencing the same kind of thing? Different kinds
of animals have different brains and their states of pain and pleasure, we might
expect, will be different in some ways. The more difficult it is to compare
states of pleasure and pain across species lines, the more difficult it is to
compare the interests to which these mental states give rise.
Singer is aware of some of the difficulties of making interspecies
comparisons of utility. He believes, however, that although it may be difficult
to know exactly how to compare states of pain and pleasure across species, the
comparison is possible, at least in principle:
If I give a horse a hard slap across its rump with my open hand, the horse may
start, but it presumably feels little pain. Its skin is thick enough to protect it
against a mere slap. If I slap a baby in the same way, however, the baby will
cry and presumably does feel pain, for the baby's skin is more sensitive. So it
is worse to slap a baby than a horse, if both slaps are administered with equal
force. But there must be some kind of blow-I don't know exactly what it
would be, but perhaps a blow with a heavy stick-that would cause the horse
as much pain as we cause a baby by a simple slap. 14 9
The problem may be more complicated than Singer's example of horse and
baby pain suggests. It may be impossible to compare a baby's pain with a
horse's pain, not because the former has soft skin and the latter has tough skin,
but because they have different brains, and presumably, different mental states.
We may think that pain is a mental state which all animals tend to avoid, and
pleasure is a mental state which all animals tend to prefer. However, we do not
know that these mental states are equally bad across species, because they may
differ not only in duration and intensity but in other hard to define ways.
John Stuart Mill argued there are higher and lower pleasures and
nonhumans can only have the latter. According to Mill, "Human beings have
faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made
conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include
their gratification."'150 When it comes to pleasures and pains, Mill emphasized
that we must consider quality as well as quantity,151 and the quality of human
experiences is potentially higher than that of animals. As evidence, Mill
argued that "[flew human creatures would consent to be changed into any of
the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's
pleasures."'1 52 Or, put more famously, "[i]t is better to be a human being
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they
149. SINGER, PRACriCAL ETiucs, supra note 128, at 59.
150. JoHN STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in ON LiBERTY AND UTILTARIANISM 145 (Alan
M. Dershowitz ed., Bantam Books 1993) (1871).
151. Id. at 145-46.
152. Id. at 146-47.
Oct. 2001]
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison
knows both. '153
While I am not so sure that Socrates really knows what it is like to be a pig,
it is fair to say that humans can experience depths of pleasure and suffering
which nonhuman animals cannot. A chimpanzee cannot experience the pain
felt by Hamlet in discovering that his uncle killed his father and married his
mother (assuming that there really had been a Hamlet who had such
experiences). It may be that chimpanzee pain differs not only in intensity from
human pain but also in kind. In the case of interpersonal assessments of
suffering among humans, we know that normal humans have brain structures
that are, at some level, nearly identical. We can plausibly extrapolate that
human states of pain and pleasure are also quite similar in kind. In the case of
great apes and other animals, we have overwhelming scientific evidence that
these beings experience pleasure and pain. We do not know, however, what
their pain feels like from the inside and whether that pain is somehow not as
bad in beings with lower cognitive functions.
Singer cites some neuroanatomical and evolutionary evidence indicating
that animal pain is similar to human pain. Singer writes:
Although human beings have a more developed cerebral cortex than other
animals, this part of the brain is concerned with thinking functions rather than
with basic impulses, emotions, and feelings. These impulses, emotions, and
feelings are located in the diencephalon, which is well developed in many
other species of animals, especially mammals and birds.154
Also, Singer indicates that human and animal nervous systems evolved in the
same way and that the "evolutionary history of human beings and other
animals, especially mammals, did not diverge until the central features of our
nervous systems were already in existence." 155 In summary, then, "it is surely
unreasonable to suppose that nervous systems that are virtually identical
physiologically, have a common origin and a common evolutionary function,
and result in similar forms of behavior in similar circumstances should actually
operate in an entirely different manner on the level of subjective feelings." 156
Even if Singer is right that human and other mammalian brains are
substantially similar (certainly a controversial point), they still differ somewhat.
It is very difficult to tell how important these differences are likely to be. The
science of neurophysiology is only partly helpful in telling us about the internal
experiences of other organisms. Certainly, neurophysiology alone will not tell
us how to value different, if similar, experiences.
153. Id. at 148.
154. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, supra note 103, at 11. Singer cites this point to the
appropriately-named Lord Brain, Presidential Address, in THE AsSESSMENT OF PAIN IN MEN
AND ANmALS (C.A. Keele & R. Smith, eds., 1962).
155. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, supra note 103, at 11.
156. Id.
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Furthermore, our higher cognitive functions may interact with our simple
experiences of pleasure and pains in nonobvious ways. These higher cognitive
functions may play a role in the value of our experiences such that we cannot
really separate out simple pleasures and pains from the rest of our cognitive
apparatus. It may be that human pain is generally worse than chimpanzee pain
which is generally worse than tortoise pain, not because humans are more
important than chimps which are more important than tortoises. Instead, it may
be that the nature of their experiences, even when they are supposed to be
simple experiences of "pain" or "pleasure," are qualitatively different.
The proportional consideration view is an arguably nonspeciesist way to
achieve a speciesist result. It may be criticized for exploiting the difficulties in
assessing interspecies utility in order to give a somewhat fanciful tale of the
nature of experience that retains some level of human dominance. Singer
might argue against it by first admitting that we cannot fully understand the
nature of the experiences of a nonhuman being. And, in the absence of
evidence to think, for example, that cow suffering is not as bad as human
suffering, it is speciesist to assume that it is. In fact, it is possible that a cow's
pain is somehow worse than a human's pain. When confronted with difficult
questions of animal cognition and the philosophy of mind, Singer can respond,
quite reasonably, by noting that the assumptions we make in the face of
uncertainty often reflect an unjustified speciesist attitude.
Furthermore, the proportional consideration view falls completely flat
when we reexamine issues of human equality. Proportional consideration
yields the wrong results when applied to humans, since the principle would
suggest that the interests of more intelligent humans are entitled to greater
consideration than those of less intelligent humans. These views are
inegalitarian in result. They provide only stronger moral support to our
hypothetical ultraintelligent alien invaders who seek to satisfy their cravings for
human flesh. The price of maintaining the dominance of humans over apes
over chickens through proportional consideration arguments is that we no
longer have principles that can be generalized throughout the animal kingdom,
since they fall short as soon as we look to our fellow humans.
III. JURAL STANDING FOR APES AND OTHER ANIMALS
We need not resolve the deep questions raised by Singer and his critics in
order to seek certain incremental changes in the law. So far, I have tried to
establish two relatively uncontroversial points that will bear on the law of
standing. The first point is that sentient animals do have interests and that
these interests are recognized, to some degree, in our substantive laws. These
interests are not as extensively recognized and protected as some animal
liberationists would like them to be, but nevertheless, the law does recognize
that we have direct duties to protect animals under certain circumstances.
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The second point is that great apes have interests that are at least as
substantial as those of other sentient animals and are probably quite a bit
stronger. If one is convinced by Singer's principle of equal consideration, then
the need to increase protection for great apes is strong because the need to
increase protection for all sentient animals is strong. Great apes, perhaps
having unique needs for cognitive stimulation and emotional interaction, are a
logical starting point to focus protective efforts. If on the other hand, one
views animal interests as deserving proportional consideration, one may still
recognize that the interests of humans and nonhuman animals are close enough
to require increased protections for all animals. Great apes, which can
communicate with sign language and are surprisingly close to us in cognitive
ability, are in the most urgent need of protective resources because, perhaps,
their interests are somehow more intense and more deserving of our
consideration than those of the rest of the nonhuman animal kingdom.
We do not need to think that the interests of nonhuman animals are
anywhere near as strong as those of humans to recognize that the interests of
nonhuman animals can figure into some sort of balancing, however weak,
against our own. The discussion of the law of standing which follows will not
be limited to concerns about great apes. Whatever protections we believe all
animals to deserve (such as those protections provided by the Animal Welfare
Act), great apes will deserve protections that are at least as strong.
A. The Law of Standing
It is sometimes noted that the biggest impediment to the protection of
animal interests is not so much the weakness of substantive animal protections
but rather the obstacles to their effective enforcement. With respect to the
Animal Welfare Act, the USDA has frequently been accused of inadequate
regulatory implementation 157 and insufficient enforcement. 158 Perhaps even
more importantly, "[iln virtually all AWA claims, legal failures result not from
any deficiency on the merits of the cases brought before the courts, but rather
from jurisdictional challenges to third parties."' 159 Since animals cannot enforce
their rights directly, they must depend on regulatory and other law enforcement
to do the job. When regulators and police are too busy or uninterested to
pursue violations of animal cruelty and related laws, private parties may try to
step in. While these private parties might be thought ideal to help protect
animals (notably because they invest their own resources), they are frequently
157. Joseph Mendelson, III, Should Animals Have Standing? A Review of Standing
Under the Animal Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. A_ .L. Rnv. 795, 796 (1997).
158. The Congressional Record indicates, for example, that in the first ten years after
the implementation of what is now the Animal Welfare Act, the USDA brought only two
enforcement actions. 132 CONG. Rc. H1643-03 (statement of Rep. Chandler).
159. Mendelson, supra note 157, at 796; see, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v.
Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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limited from bringing suits on behalf of animals due to constitutional and
statutory limits on access to federal courts.
Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts
to "cases" or "controversies." 160 Along with ,the other doctrines of
justiciability, standing requirements "state fundamental limits on federal
judicial power." 161 They decide the question of "whether the litigant is entitled
to have the court decide the merits of the dispute." 162
A principal rationale for standing doctrine is to make sure that plaintiffs are
sufficiently vested in the outcome of a case so that they seek to vigorously
argue their position. As provided in Baker v. Carr,163 litigants must have
"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional issues." 164
Standing doctrine also helps to preserve separation of powers principles. By
limiting courts to the adjudication of cases of actual harm to actual litigants,
courts are deterred from stepping on the political branch's role of shaping
broad policies for the future. 165
To meet standing requirements, a plaintiff must demonstrate having
suffered 1) an injury-in-fact 66 that was 2) caused by the defendant's action and
that 3) a favorable judicial ruling will redress the plaintiffs injury.167 If a
plaintiff had no injury or did not allege that the injury was caused by the party
being sued or could not identify some appropriate form of judicial redress,
there would not be much point in having a court hear the plaintiffs case. Aside
from these requirements purportedly derived from the text of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court has added the so-called "prudential requirements" for
160. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The clause states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between
a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-- between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
161. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
162. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975).
163. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
164. Id. at 204; see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERiCAN CoNsTITuTONAL LAW § 3-14 (2d
ed. 1988) (noting that "[s]tanding questions arise principally in challenges to government
conduct, where litigants often lack the obvious stake normally present in most lawsuits
between private parties").
165. Justice Scalia has taken this view in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
166. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464,472 (1982).
167. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
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standing. Namely, courts will not adjudicate "generalized grievances," and
ordinarily, they will not permit plaintiffs to claim the rights of third parties.168
In the case of the Animal Welfare Act, prudential requirements for bringing
suit are imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),1 69 which
provides for judicial review to any person "suffering legal wrong because of an
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action within
the meaning of the relevant statute." 170 Importantly, the Supreme Court has
found "that a plaintiffs injury must arguably fall within the zone of interests
protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee
invoked by the suit."' 171 Therefore, in cases brought by plaintiffs under the
Animal Welfare Act, the Act must either implicitly or explicitly grant that
plaintiff a cause of action.
For an alleged injury to satisfy standing requirements, the injury must
invade a legally protected interest which is a) concrete and particularized 172
and b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. 173 Suppose, for
example, that I am having lunch with an accountant friend of mine. She tells
me that, just a week ago, she was knocked down by a United States Postal
Service delivery truck and had to be treated for severe bruises and lacerations
at a nearby hospital. Apparently, the truck driver was assigned more hours
than regulations permit and fell asleep at the wheel. I suggest that she consider
bringing suit against the driver or the postal service. My friend satisfies the
injury-in-fact requirement because she has a legally protected interest in her
bodily integrity that is particular to her (concrete and particularized) and has
already happened (so it is actual and not merely hypothetical). Nevertheless,
my friend chooses not to pursue a case because she does not like getting
involved in such matters. Despite whatever outrage I feel at the injustice of her
situation, it is very unlikely that a federal court would give me standing to
bring suit. I have not suffered an injury-in-fact that would establish standing
under the Constitution because my generalized feeling of outrage at the action
of a government employee is not legally recognized, and it did not affect me in
a particular way that differentiates me from anyone else. Furthermore, my
168. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
169. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
170. Id.
171. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. at 162.
172. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 (1992). In Defenders of Wildlife, plaintiffs
sought to challenge the lack of extraterritorial enforcement of certain provisions of the
Endangered Species Act. Although some of the plaintiffs had established themselves as
interested in seeing and studying the animals at-risk, plaintiffs were denied standing for
failing to demonstrate concrete plans to visit the animals. The Court implied that had the
plaintiffs bought a plane ticket to visit the animals, they would have established the injury-
in-fact requirement needed for standing. Id. at 564. A plurality of the Court, however, felt
that even under such circumstances, the plaintiffs would still have failed to establish the
redressability requirement. Id.at 568.
173. Id. at 560.
[Vol. 54:163
STANDING OF HUMANS AND APES
claims that I fear that I am at risk for being hurt in the future by a mail carrier
will probably fail, as the danger is not actual but merely hypothetical.
Often, attempts to bring suit on behalf of animals fail because humans
cannot meet the injury-in-fact requirement of standing law. Describing the
kind of injury required to obtain standing, Judge Posner has written that the
injury "must in short be fairly describable as an injury personal to the
plaintiff-a deprivation of his right-rather than a concern with another's
injury."17 4 It is exactly this requirement that an injury be personal to a litigant
that makes it hard for humans to obtain standing under the AWA. Since
humans are not the principle locus of the inhumane treatment that the AWA
was designed to protect, they have difficulty demonstrating injuries resulting
from violations of the Act.
If animals were granted standing to sue, they could easily satisfy injury-in-
fact requirements when suffering from violations of the AWA. Where an
animal has been inhumanely treated in violation of the AWA, the animal has an
injury-in-fact that the AWA expressly seeks to prevent. An animal's human
representative could then plausibly show that USDA action or inaction in
violation of the AWA caused the animal injuries that can be remedied by
appropriate USDA action.
Contrary to the aspirations of the Great Ape Project and other animal
liberationists, however, animals are not recognized as legal persons who can
have independent standing.175 There are, however, a number of suits in which
animals are cited as named plaintiffs. 176 Often, these cases never directly
address the animal standing issue. In at least one case, a federal court held that
"[a]s an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act, the bird
(Loxioides ballieu), a member of the Hawaiian honey-creeper family, also has
legal status and wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own
right."'177 Other cases have held that animals do not have independent jural
standing,178 and this is widely taken to be positive law. 179
174. People Organized for Welfare and Employment Rights (P.O.W.E.R.) v.
Thompson, 727 F.2d 167, 171 (7th Cir. 1984).
175. See Miles v. City Council, 710 F.2d 1542, 1544 n.5 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting,
while poking fun at the case, that a performing cat which could make human speech sounds
had no right to free speech since it is not a "person" and is not protected under the Bill of
Rights).
176. See, e.g., Am. Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d. 163 (1st Cir. 1993); Mt. Graham Red
Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1991); V.I. Tree Boa v. Witt, 918 F. Supp. 879
(D.V.I. 1996); Loggerhead Turtle v. City Council, 896 F. Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla. 1995); N.
Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991); N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716
F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
177. Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 853 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted).
178. Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1359; see Citizens to End Animal Suffering &
Exploitation v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993); Hawaiian Crow
v. Lujan, 905 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Haw. 1991).
179. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1359 ("As a rule, the question is therefore
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Granting animals standing to sue under the Animal Welfare Act is very
different, however, from granting animals legal personhood. If animals had
standing under the AWA, private plaintiffs could represent them to help
enforce existing, congressionally-mandated laws protecting animals. For
example, an animal advocacy organization could not represent a capuchin
monkey in a suit against an organ grinder for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. No such cause of action exists under current law. The organization
might, however, be able to sue the USDA for inappropriately interpreting the
AWA in such a way that led to the unlawful sheltering of the capuchin.
Granting animals full legal personhood is a much vaguer notion that would
require changes to the substantive laws protecting animals, rather than the more
procedural laws that affect standing.
Why do animals lack standing under the AWA? Cass Sunstein writes that
"[a]nimals lack standing as such, simply because no relevant statute confers a
cause of action on animals." 180 Other statutes grant standing to persons who
might otherwise not have it,181 and Sunstein thinks it possible "that before too
long, Congress will grant standing to animals to protect their own rights and
interests" 182 through counsel with guardian-like obligations, not unlike the
ways in which children or corporations are represented. 183 As for the
constitutionality of such a legislative action given the "case" or "controversy"
requirement, Sunstein sees no significant problem as "[n]othing in the text of
the Constitution limits cases to actions brought by persons."1 84
Of course, an originalist interpretation of the Constitution might conclude
that the founding generation did not intend to grant standing to anyone who is
not a human being.185 However, as a matter of positive law, standing is given
to all sorts of entities, whether human or not. For example, corporations are
juridical persons, and "legal rights are also given to trusts, municipalities,
partnerships, and even ships."' 186 Sunstein also notes that slaves were allowed
quite clear: Animals lack standing as such, simply because no relevant statute confers a
cause of action on animals.").
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2001); Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1377 (2001); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C. § 1540 (2001).
182. Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1359.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1360.
185. Id. On this originalist view, Justice Frankfurter argued that Article III means "that
a court will not decide a question unless the nature of the action challenged, the kind of
injury inflicted, and the relationship between the parties are such that judicial determination
is consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of the Colonial courts and the
courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Steven
L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1371, 1394-96 (1988) (describing the historical evolution of standing doctrine).
186. Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1360-61; see also Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees
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to bring causes of action, "often through a white guardian or 'next friend,' to
challenge unjust servitude," 187 even though slaves were not considered legal
persons.
In Sierra Club v. Morton,188 the United States Forest Service granted Walt
Disney Enterprises a permit to construct a ski resort in Mineral King Valley in
the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club challenged this decision under
the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides for judicial review to a
person who suffers "legal wrong because of agency action, or [is] adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute." 189 Though the Sierra Club won a preliminary injunction in federal
district court, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, 190 finding
that the Sierra Club lacked standing. The Sierra Club did not allege that the
Forest Service's action, which they claimed violated the law, affected the
Sierra Club's membership in its actual use of the forest; rather, the Sierra
Club's members merely found the permit grant, in the words of the court,
"personally displeasing or distasteful to them." 19 1 The Supreme Court affirmed
the Ninth Circuit decision. In dissent, however, Justice Douglas wrote, ".The
critical question of 'standing' would be simplified and also put neatly in focus
if we... allowed environmental issues to be litigated... in the name of the
inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded.... " 192 In the
same case, Justice Blackmun indicated some support for Justice Douglas'
"imaginative expansion" of standing doctrine. 193 If U.S. Supreme Court
Justices are willing to consider granting standing to inanimate objects like
forests, even in the absence of congressional authority, then it becomes clear
that standing requirements permit at least some degree of judicial flexibility.
B. The Need for Stronger Protection
The first reason for granting standing to great apes extends from the
arguments made in Parts I and II of this Note. Namely, great apes have
interests and current law does not adequately protect those interests. Granting
standing to great apes, subject to some caveats to be discussed, would help
Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450, 452
(1972).
187. Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1361 (referencing ROBERT B. SHAW, A LEGAL HISTORY
OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 110-53 (1991)). No doubt, the animal rights movement
may overstate analogies between animal rights and abolition. The point here is only about
the constitutional meaning of"case" or "controversy."
188. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
189. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2001).
190. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
191. Id. at33.
192. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see
also supra text accompanying note 121.
193. 405 U.S. at 757.
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protect their interests. Consider for example the issue of experimentation on
great apes and other primates. 194 Even if we believe that human interests in
improved medical treatment outweigh the interest of great apes and other
primates in continuing to live a natural life, we can still acknowledge that ape
experimental subjects should receive humane care including pain relief
medication and clean and capacious cages. Nevertheless, if inhumane
conditions exist and the USDA does nothing about it, there is virtually no way
for an animal advocacy group to gain standing to bring suit in order to gain
enforcement of AWA regulations. 195
Under current law, there are harms to animals for which no human is likely
to have an injury-in-fact. Sunstein points to a proposed statutory ban on the
importation of goods made from dogs or cats. 196 He notes the difficulties any
individual concerned about animal interests would have in obtaining standing
to sue an agency for improperly enforcing the ban since it is unlikely that the
ban is uniquely injurious to some particular human plaintiff,197 while it is
clearly injurious to a slaughtered dog or cat. Additional reasons given for
granting standing to animals are to "make a public statement about whose
interests are most directly at stake." 198 Such a public statement has no symbolic
meaning for animals, however, it could have a powerful indirect effect in
preserving animal legal protections. In addition, granting standing to animals
would increase private monitoring of violations. 199 Lastly, granting standing to
animals would "bypass complex inquiries into whether prospective human
plaintiffs have injuries in fact," 20 0 a subject to which we now turn our attention.
C. Aesthetic Injuries
The most promising standing case for great apes and other primates is
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman.20 1 In that case, Marc Jumove
claimed injuries associated with his repeated observations of the inhumane
treatment of primates at a Long Island zoo. What he observed was isolation
194. I have added the "and other primates" simply because, as discussed,
experimentation on great apes is strictly limited, for reasons independent of their individual
welfare, by the Endangered Species Act.
195. FRANCIONE, supra note 64, at 66.
196. Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1360 (referencing Dog and Cat Protection Act of 1999,
H.R. 1622, 106th Cong. (1999)).
197. See id. Sunstein notes, however, that those placed at a competitive disadvantage
by strictly observing the ban might have standing to sue. Id. Of course, these competitors
may have no interest in animal protection and may still have little incentive to take legal
action.
198. Id. citing Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 2021, 2044-45 (1996).
199. Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1360.
200. Id.
201. 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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and despondency among apes and other primates whom Jurnove, a lifelong
animal lover, understood to be social animals in need of companionship. 202 For
example, the zoo housed a large male chimpanzee in a solitary cage "where
[hie could not see or hear any other primate. '203 Perhaps this does not sound so
terrible to us, since we have typically only seen chimpanzees in their
sometimes depressed captive state. However, as suggested in Part II,
chimpanzees and other apes are social by nature and have rather active mental
lives. Chimpanzees can have stilted cognitive development if left alone in their
cages.204 While chimpanzees can engage in behavior in front of a mirror which
demonstrates self-recognition and arguably self-awareness, they may lose this
ability if they are deprived of human and chimpanzee contact.205 Some
psychologists have suggested that chimpanzees may lose their ability to imitate
and transmit species-typical behavior in the dull, sterile environments in which
some great apes are kept in captivity.206
As noted in Part I, the AWA requires the USDA to establish "minimum
requirements" to protect primate psychological well-being,207 and this law was
implicated by the treatment at the Long Island zoo. In response to the law, the
USDA issued regulations which required regulated entities, in this case the zoo,
to set up plans that take care of the needs of primates in accordance with
professional standards.208 Marc Jumove made repeated attempts to alert the
USDA to the conditions of primates at the zoo, which he alleged were in
violation of the law. While the USDA made several inspection trips, each time
the zoo was found to comply with the law, although a number of primates
remained alone in their cages without adequate stimulation, according to
Jurnove. Jumove alleged that the USDA violated the AWA by failing to
directly establish minimum requirements for primate psychological wel-being.
Rather, the agency delegated its responsibility to the regulated entities and
thereby failed to set "minimum standards. '209 Jumove contended that the
conditions that caused him injury "complied with current USDA regulations,
but that lawful regulations would have prohibited those conditions and
protected [him] from the injuries" he experienced. 210
The key statement of Marc Junmove's injury comes in the plaintiffs'
complaint. It says, "Marc Jurnove experienced and continues to experience
physical and mental distress when he realizes that he, by himself, is powerless
to help the animals he witnesses suffering when such suffering derives from or
202. Id. at 429-30 (summarizing from Jumove affidavit).
203. Id. at 429 (citing Jurnove affidavit).
204. See WIsE, supra note 5, at 166.
205. See id. at 167.
206. Id.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 80-87.
208. 9 C.F.R. § 3.81.




is traceable to the improper implementation and enforcement of the Animal
Welfare Act by [the] USDA."'211 Jumove was claiming that he was injured by
the mistreatment of primates at the zoo. Namely, he claimed to have suffered a
kind of aesthetic injury.
Federal courts have repeatedly acknowledged that aesthetic interests are
judicially cognizable, and a D.C. district court agreed with Jumove.2 12 In an en
banc rehearing of the case that was limited to the issue of standing, the D.C.
Circuit Court also agreed that Jumove had standing and, perhaps in tacit
agreement, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari. 2 13 The majority
opinion in Glickman noted that the "Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear
that injury to an aesthetic interest in the observation of animals is sufficient to
satisfy the demands of Article III standing."2 14 For example, the court cited
Defenders of Wildlife where the Court indicated that "the desire to use or
observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a
cognizable interest for purpose of standing. '2 15
So current law does provide some means for humans to bring suit under
the AWA. Clearly, however, the law has a strange implication. When it comes
to access to courts, the interest that a human has in not seeing cruelty to
animals (which can provide an injury-in-fact) counts for more than the interests
of the animal in avoiding the cruelty itself (animals have no standing). This is
certainly peculiar. Surely the reason why it pains people to see animals
suffering is that they take the animal's pain to be significant. Perhaps we think
that these people are overreacting to animal suffering, but then it seems odd to
make their overreactions judicially cognizable injuries.
211. 154 F.3d at 430-31 (citing the First Amended Complaint).
212. In U.S. District Court, Judge Charles R. Richey held that plaintiffs had standing to
sue and, on the merits of the case, held that the USDA's regulations did violate the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") by failing
to set standards, including minimum requirements, as mandated by the AWA; that the
USDA's failure to promulgate standards for a physical environment adequate to promote the
psychological well-being of primates constitute[d] agency action unlawfully withheld and
unreasonably delayed in violation of the APA; and that the USDA's failure to issue a
regulation promoting the social grouping of nonhuman primates [was] arbitrary, capricious,
and an abuse of discretion in violation of the APA.
Id. at 431 (summarizing the lower court decision). However, on appeal, the decision on the
merits was overturned. See Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
213. Nat'l Ass'n for Biomedical Research v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc., 526 U.S.
1064 (1999).
214. 154 F.3d at 432.
215. 504 U.S. at 562-63. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S.
221, 231 n.4 (1986) (finding that plaintiffs had "undoubtedly... alleged a sufficient 'injury
in fact' in that the whale watching and studying of their members will be adversely affected
by continued whale harvesting" (citation omitted)); see also Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v.
Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Japan Whaling Association and Defenders of Wildlife clearly recognize people's
affirmative aesthetic interest in viewing animals enjoying their natural habitat.").
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As mentioned, one of the justifications for standing doctrine is to ensure
that parties have a strong enough stake in a case "to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues. '216 Yet, if we are
interested in sharpening the issues, it would seem that judicial resources should
focus on the party which is primarily injured, namely some animal, over a party
which has some secondary injury, namely an aesthetic injury from observing
the primary injury. "If you become indignant reading about a case of police
brutality," Judge Posner notes, "you cannot sue the responsible officers in
federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."217 Yet, what if you observe the brutality
and claim an aesthetic injury? By analogy to Jurnove's case, it would seem that
an aesthetically-injured observer could have standing to sue. But surely we
would prefer, all else being equal, that suit be brought by the direct victim of
the brutality since the victim will ordinarily have the most at stake in the
litigation. Surely, we would prefer a policy where the direct victim at least had
the opportunity to bring suit. Under the AWA, the direct victims of abuse are
given no such opportunity. Of course, in animal contexts, there is probably no
important difference between the kind of litigation which would be brought by
Jurnove as the victim of an aesthetic injury compared to the litigation brought
by Jurnove as the guardian of a particular group of primates. However, to the
extent that we want standing doctrine to be based on a coherent set of
principles, it would seem wise to have policies that prefer suits brought by
direct victims of harm over those brought by indirect victims. Standing law
under the AWA has the opposite result.
Aesthetic injuries are subjective and, in the animal welfare context, they
are derivative of a greater harm. Allowing aesthetic injuries to satisfy injury-
in-fact requirements may be a mere rationalization designed to bridge a
procedural gap to enabling a plaintiff to argue the merits of her case. This
casuistic leap over the injury-in-fact requirement may very well have an
animal's best interests at heart; and it may be a better option than giving private
plaintiffs no means of asserting animal protections. However, it may also open
the door to claims of aesthetic injuries-in-fact where they should not otherwise
be granted.
D. Underrepresentation ofAnimal Interests
Even the most ardent animal rights activists admit that equal consideration
of the interests of animals does not entail giving them the right to vote. If the
right to vote means the right to enter a ballot box and make a selection of
candidates, then surely they are right-no animal benefits from such a right.
However, if the right to vote is thought of as a proxy for political
216. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
217. People Organized for Welfare and Employment Rights (P.O.W.E.R.) v.
Thompson, 727 F.2d 167, 171 (7th Cir. 1984).
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representation, then it seems that animals are being shortchanged. If we
acknowledge that animals have legitimate moral and legal interests (even if not
equal to our own) and we acknowledge that they have no political voice of their
own, it is reasonable to think that their interests will be politically
underrepresented. 218
Surely, there are people and organizations who fight on behalf of animals.
However, these people have finite resources to expend on political issues.
Forcing them to expend their own resources to protect animal interests means
that they must sacrifice their personal political interests to some extent. So, we
are either underrepresenting the interests of animals or the interests of animal
activists or some combination of both.2 19 Perhaps this explains why laws like
the AWA are more symbolic than forceful. Animal interests are sufficiently
represented to enable relatively cost-free legislation to be passed but are not
represented sufficiently for the more expensive task of enforcing legislation.
E. Some Caveats
My purpose here has not been to give an all-things-considered argument
for granting standing to great apes. Many questions remain unanswered. To
know if granting such standing would be a good idea, we would need to look
more carefully at the USDA's enforcement problems. Perhaps it would be
more effective to simply push for better USDA enforcement (despite my
suggestion that animal interests will be systematically underrepresented in
budgetary decisions). Also, were animals granted standing, we would need to
be concerned about potential abuse by animal advocacy organizations.
Requiring the loser to pay legal costs in such cases might reduce abuse, but the
218. This argument applies, even more forcefully, to children and profoundly retarded
people. If their guardians were granted the right to vote on their behalf, it is likely that their
interests would be better represented. See Robert W. Bennett, Should Parents Be Given
Extra Votes on Account of Their Children?: Toward a Controversial Understanding of
American Democracy, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 503 (2000); see also Barnett v. City of Chicago,
141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.) ("It is not as if the proposal were to give
extra votes to families with more than the average number of children, a bizarre suggestion
in our political culture but one that could be defended with reference to the concept of virtual
representation."). Unlike children and the mentally incompetent, animals are not citizens
and so perhaps are not entitled to vote (even illegal aliens and permanent residents are not
entitled to vote). On a proportional consideration view, however, each sentient animal could
be entitled to some fraction of a full vote made by a guardian on its behalf. The practical
difficulties of such a program, in the case of animals, are fairly obvious.
219. Again, this is based on the probably accurate assumption that were animal
activists no longer required to fight for animal rights, they would use their energies to more
forcefully pursue other political issues that concern them. Granted, it may seem odd that
animal activist and animal welfare organizations could conserve resources by gaining the
right to serve as legal guardians of animals. Certainly, however, to the extent that
organizations would choose to pursue this option, they would do so because they can
accomplish their goals (mainly deterrence) more cost effectively than by lobbying the
government to spend more on enforcement resources.
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novelty of animal standing would raise many complications that are difficult to
foresee. We would also want to know more about the "guardian-like"
arrangements that would be established to protect animals and what would
happen when multiple groups sought involvement in the same case. To the
extent that Congress made an incremental change in standing requirements,
perhaps as a sort of legislative experiment, great apes would be logical starting
candidates to qualify for standing since their numbers are relatively few and
their needs are greater.
There are other ways to help great apes and other animals that are worthy
of consideration. Many environmental statutes have citizen-suit provisions that
allow private plaintiffs to bring suit against violators.2 20 These provisions have
helped Congress to improve enforcement of environmental laws by allowing
citizens, in certain cases, to act as "private attorneys general" as an "alternative
means of enforc[ing]" a statute.22 1 The AWA does not contain such a provision
and previous attempts to obtain such legislation have failed.222 But even with a
citizen suit provision, there are still standing requirements imposed by the
Constitution, and private citizens would still need to show injuries-in-fact. A
citizen suit provision would certainly strengthen protections for animals but
would not alleviate the problem that courts countenance the weaker injuries of
humans that derive from injuries to animals rather than recognizing those
injuries directly.
My point has been to show that granting standing to animals (particularly
great apes) is a plausible means of addressing inadequate regulatory
enforcement of the AWA. Granting standing provides a means of satisfying
reasonable constitutional limitations on federal court access by recognizing
animals as injured parties rather than recognizing humans who have suffered
simply by witnessing animal suffering. Also, granting standing to great apes,
at least as a start, would acknowledge that these beings do have interests that
should be respected, even at some cost to humans. In a country that recognizes
the lawsuit, U.S. v. 449 Cases, More or Less, Containing Tomato Paste,223 it
220. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2001); Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2001); Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2001); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972
(2001); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2001); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2001); see also Rob Roy Smith,
Standing on Their Own Four Legs: The Future of Animal Welfare Litigation After Animal
Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 29 ENvTL. L. 989 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, What's
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article HI, 91 MICH. L. Rnv. 163,
165 (1992).
221. Stephen Fotis, Private Enforcement of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act,
35 AM. U. L. REv. 127, 136 (1985) (citation omitted).
222. Smith, supra note 220, at 1026, n.300.
223. 111 F. Supp. 478 (E.D.N.Y. 1953). Such titles are typical of cases involving civil
property forfeiture. See Paul Schiff Berman, An Anthropological Approach to Modern
Forfeiture Law: The Symbolic Function of Legal Action Against Objects, I 1 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1 (1999).
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should not be such a frightening prospect to allow apes or other animals, under
specified conditions, to have their interests represented in court.
